








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Gremmen, H. J. F. M. (1990). Macro-economic implications of profit optimizing investment behaviour. (Research
memorandum / Tilburg University, Department of Economics; Vol. FEW 431). Unknown Publisher.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
E 3 ..i`~~~~6~~IIIIIII~I~IIIIII~IIIIIII~ill11'~Illlll
ll,~ill,l~~l




~. . ~- ..--- .......~.";
FEw 43i
MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
PROFIT OPTIMIZING INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR
Contents: I Introduction, II The Model, III Simulatioiis, IV Conclusions
By Hans J. Gremmen,
Tilburg University
I Introduction
Many authors assume that entrepreneurial decisions regarding investments
in fixed assets are based on a strive for profit maximization. In accor-
dance with the neo-classical micro-economic approach, they assume that
investments depend on output and relative capital costs. Some examples are
Kopcke [1985], Jorgenson [1963], Claassen [1980] and Scotland [1981].
Their proposition is that investments, partly or completely, close 'the
gap' between the stock of capital that minimizes production costs and the
actual stock of capital. The assumed behaviour is symmetric: of a positive
gap a part is filled (by investments) that equals the part that is filled
(by disinvestments) of a negative gap. The degree to which the gap is
filled is either exogenous or depending on the expected rate of return. In
both cases, this approach, however, basically ignores the existence of
risk in the sense that a deviation of the actual size of a plant for a
risk averter causes disutilíty. An expansion of the capital stock implies
that more money is at stake in a risky world, a shrinking stock of capital
causes a decline in the market share which may be difficult to recapture.
Under these circumstances entrepreneurs will no longer strive for profit
maximization, but for profit optimization.
The present article investigates the macro-economic consequences of this
profit optimizing investment behaviour. First of all, it shows, that,
whereas with a profit maximizing investment behaviour the economy will as
a rule reach a new long run equilibrium after an impulse, with a profit
optimizing investment behaviour, this need not be the case.
More importantly, it will demonstrate that the profit optimizing invest-
ment behaviour developed here, implies a negative impact of the existence
z
of business cycles on the average capital stock. As a consequence, a go-
vernment policy invoking or aggravating business cycles as such implies a
negative supply shock, with negative effects on production and employment
and a positive impact on inflation. The negative effects of this supply
shock also spread out to other countries. As a consequence, the possibili-
ty cannot be ruled out, that, although exchange rates are fixed, a
positive demand impulse in one country will on balance have negative
effects on the outside world. In that case, even in a demand oriented
model, a demand policy is internationally conflicting.
II The Model
To analyse the effects of the alternative investment hypotheses (profit
maximizing vs. profit optimizing) both nationally and internationally,
i.e., including international repercussions, we apply a symmetric macro-
economic model for more than one (in this case arbitrary four) large
countries -labelled 1, 2, 3 and 4- with flexible levels of output and
flexible prices. As far as unilateral impulses (say in country 1 only) are
analysed the model becomes asymmetric. If all countries act equally, the
results resemble those of a closed economy. First, we describe the beha-
vioural equations of demand and supply, respectively, except for the in-
vestment functions. Next, we turn to the alternative specifications of
investment behaviour.
In each country, consumer demand for home produced and imported products
equals net labour income, and real material government expenditures are
exogenous. Relative international prices determine the ratio of real home
consumption over imports.l) In a closed world economy, exports equal the
imports by the remaining (three) countries out of the economy concerned.
In production, following a Cobb-Douglas production function, firms combine
under perfect competition labour and capital (both homogeneous). In the
short run, the amount of labour employed may vary, whereas capital is
fixed, due to an installation lag of one period of investments. Output
1) We disregard transport costs and the like, and exchange rates are
fixed and set equsl to one.
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prices and production are found by the intersection of demand and supply,
where the latter is derived by combining the production function with the
assumption of profit maximization. Given capital, the output volume deter-
mines labour demand.
Labour supply is constant. International mobility of production factors is
ruled out and nominal wages (PL) are fixed. Unemployment benefits, paid by
the government, are lower than the wage rate.
In short, for country i we postulate (where N-nominal, symbols without
suffix refer to the 'home' country i, ell countries are structured simi-
larly, j - 1...4):
(1) YN - CON t IN t GN t EXN
where Y- demand, CO - consumption of home produced goods, I- investment
expenditures, EX - exports;
(2) CON t MN - NHI
where MN - value of imports, NHI - nominal net household income - YL (firm
wage bill) . TRF (social security payments) - BL (direct household taxes);
(3) CONco - P
Y
where P- price in home currency of home produced good;Y
(4) mij - E co(Pyi~Pyj)
where mij - real imports in i out of j, E- parameter.2)
The production function y-,~plcl-S (with y- output, ,~ - private employ-
ment, k- capital stock, ~- parameter) combined with profit maximization
production leads to the short run supply function
2) E is fixed, which implies an elasticity of substitution between co and
m equal to 1.
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k - s~l lt-s
with i- gross investments (installation lag - 1 period), p- life span.
Next, we describe the two alternative investment hypotheses, first the one
based on profit maximization (cost minimization) and, secondly, the one
assuming profit optimization.
For the former we need the cost minimizing ('desired') capital stock, kx.
Following Gould and Waud [19~3], k" should depend "only on exogenous
quantities that are unaffected by the firm's (investment) decisions or
adjustment process" (p. 35). In other words, it would be incorrect to have
today's investment determined by today's output where the latter depends
on the actual capital stock which is in turn, determined by the
investments themselves.
To circumvent this simultaneity, we assume two time lags in the investment
process. The investment decision in period t leads to the actual invest-
ment (i.e., the purchase of a machine) in ttl 3) and, due to the
installation lag referred to above, to capital accumulation in t}2. As a
consequence, the investment decision of period t(iD) is determined by the
gap between the stock of capital expected to minimize production costs in
t~2 (kw) on the one hand, and the capital stock that will be obtained (in
tt2) if (net) investment decisions (in t) are zero, on the other.
Following Jorgenson [1963] and Scotland [1981], for example, replacement
1(c.q. sutonomous) investment is assumed to equal depreciation (~ k)
throughout.
3) This lag is for example also found in H.S. Tjan [1985]. P.5.
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Following standard price theory, k~ is determined by the expected price of
capital, Pk, that of labour, PL, and expected macro-economic output,
ye:4)
P l e
(7) k~ - ye~ (1~ PkJ )~L
A central variable in the investment decision making process is the
expected output price level, Pe (see also eq.(8) below). For the goods
Y
market structure we assume rational expectations with limited information
(see De Jong [1988]), where 'limited information' pertains to the factors
exogenous to this market. These factors are calculated applying the 'weak
form of the efficient market hypothesis' (Sijben [1984]). For each of
them, say x, xe - x(gX)2 in which gX resembles an extrapolation factor
based on 'bounded memory' (Fourgeaud et al [1984]) where the most recent
information regarding x gets the highest weight.5) This formulation is
followed to get, for example, expected nominal demand, YNe.
The rationality of the expected goods market structure prescribes that the
expected output price level, Pe (and with it Pk), should subsequently beY
determined by the ratio of YNe over ye and that the latter (also by
analogy with the actual product market) should be determined as:
~.
(8)6) ye - ke~ pyeJ l-SP L
4) All expectations discussed here refer to the expected values for two
years after the current decision to invest, unless otherwise indicated.
e O-1 xt-~ 0
5) We specify gx as ( F x (0-~))~ ï e.
i-0 t-i-1 i-1
6) Actually, the computer model used for the calculations below, also
contains, both for the 'actual' and the 'expected market', a vertical
branch of the short run supply curve, indicating that labour is short. As
in the calculations to be shown the rate of unemployment stays positive,
we leave this branch out here.
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To prevent the simultaneity problem of Gould and Waud (see above), in (8)
ke (the expected macro-economic capital stock) should be determined sepa-
rately from the current investment decision. We assume that entrepreneurs
expect that next period's investments (i.e., this period's investment
decisions) equal actual (current) investments corrected for the expected
growth in real final demand.
Formally,
(9) ke - k- it-O - lt-Otl } lt } lttl
where ittl -(gFD ' i), in which gFD resembles the expected rate of growth
(plus one) in real final demand.
The equations listed so far result in k". The 'gap' equals the difference
between k" and the stock of capital that would result if no net invest-
ments were planned (kt}1). Thet is, gap - kw -(k-it-~tit).~)
Finally, the traditional approach assumes the net investment decision (iD)
to equal a fixed proportion (C1) of gap, disregarding a possible disutili-
ty connected with changes in the capital stock (risk).
As an alternative, we introduce here an investment behaviour based on an
amended version of the "non-Euclidic profit theory" as found in Hartog
C1979. P-2257. where the optimal size of the firm (i.e., the optimal
capital stock) is established via a utility-approach.
In that approach, utility increases (degressively) with expected profits
and decreases (more than proportionately) with the amount of capital in-
volved. Amended for our problem, we assume that entrepreneurs are "conser-
vative" in the sense that deviation of the capital stock from its present
level yields disutility. This disutility grows more than proportionately
with the deviation concerned. Reasons for the disutility are given in the
introduction. It could also be based on the existence of financial or
social adjustment costs (Kort [1988]) or on technical barriers (Jorgenson
[1963]) progressively connected to changes in k.
~) In the remainder, when we speak of 'the gap' we refer to this defini-
tion.
Still, utility grows less than proportionately with expected profits.
Concrete, we assume the following utility-function:
0.8
(10) u - cl . YR}C2 - c3 . {~dk~)4
R 2
where YR represents current (net) profits plus the (net) cost reduction
expected to follow from a (partial) move towards k~, and YR resembles
current net profits. C1, C2 and C~ are constants.8)
(10) fulfills the requirements bé ~ 0, ~22e ( 0' Ssdk ( 0 and 2U2 ~ 0'bYR b YR b Idkl
The alternative investment hypotheses are visualised in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1, added in the back]
The curve 'd(U) - 0' resembles combinations of net (dis)investments and
expected profits (YR) that yield the same level of utility. OC indicates
the estimated 'gap' (in absolute terms) between actual and cost minimizing
stocks of capital. If investments fully close this gap (implying
Idkl - OC), the expected increase in profits equals DC. Investment hy-
potheses based on profit maximization therefore (cumulatively) lead to OC
as net investments, where cet. par. a new stationary equilibrium results.
With profit optimization, however, net investments are determined by the
point where the increase in utility (by virtue of higher expected profits)
is outweighed by the decrease in utility (due to higher net (dis)invest-
ments). In Figure 1 in that case net investments equal OE. Depending on
the relative weights in (10), the gap may never be closed.
When applying equation (10), for each marginal unit of investment, say
8) C2 should be such that the factor in brackets is positive. The final
term in (10) could also be stated in relative terms. As in the calcula-
tions below k does not fluctuate much, this possibility is neglected.
8
a 9), the expected reductíon in production costs is calculated as thei
expected reduction in labour costs minus the expected increase in capital
costs (both in net terms).
For each "step" i(extra marginal investment) the expected reduction in
labour costs equals (with i- 1...200 and a0 - 0)
10) e ~~ye~l,
Ll e
t-1 1(1-1~ ) ~ e e (1-1~ )
(11) pL X ~0 ~ kt{li bEO~J ~ - kt}1} b~1~J ~ JJ
(A) (B)
whereas the increase in expected costs of capital, equals
(12)11) pk x p ab
b-0
For each step, the increase in utility is calculated along the lines pro-
vided by (10). Step j which does not increase this level is left out when
determining total planned net investments, ip, as
(13)
j-1
iD - ï a
i-1 e
As well as the profit maximizing investment behaviour, this optimizing
approach implies a positive relation between the size of the gap and the
investments. But it seems more plausible than the former, as it entails
the following likely features:
-of a small Igapl a larger proportion is 'closed' by net (dis)investments
9) Equal to 0.005 gap. That is ~- 1, 2, 3, ... 200. For covenience, the
description in the main text is restricted to a) 0, but the resulting
formulas also apply to a~ 0. ~i
10) The outcome of (11), is positive for a~ 0 and negative for a~ 0.
11) A policy raising the expected price of capital, raises ( 12) and conse-
quently reduces OE in Figure 1. Investments obtained in the profit maximi-
zing approach would also shrink, but now because of a drop in k'. See eq.
(~). In both cases curve 1 bows inward.
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-a firm incurring losses (or modest profits) will be more anxious to reach
the cost minimizing stock of capital than a firm making (higher) profits,
i.e., it implies a plausible asymmetry.
Technically, this asymmetry is produced b 2y~U ~S2Ye ~ 0, as well as by the
R
denominator in the first term (both: equation 10): the higher current net
profits, the lower the increase in utility caused by a certain expected
cost reduction.
These two features, not embodied in the traditional profit maximizing
approach, favour an investment behaviour based on profit optimization. The
next section deals with the macro-economic consequences of these
alternative investment hypotheses.
III Simulationsl2)
Each of both above mentioned advantages of the profit optimizing approach
over the traditional profit maximizing one, has its own macro-economic
implications.
The first one leads to a continuous cyclical development in endogenous key
variables in the economy, as opposed to a return to a(possibly new) trend
value if the profit maximizing investment behaviour is assumed. This
effect is illustrated by means of a(world-wide) government expenditure
increase under profit maximizing and profit optimizing investment
behaviour, respectively.
The sequence of events if investments are a fixed proportion of 'gap' is
summarized as follows. The extra demand immediately raises output prices
and output (eqs. (1) and (5)), i.e., to an increase is nominal output. As
a consequence, expected nominal demand also increases, causing a rise both
in expected supply (ye, see eq. (8)) and in the expected output price
level. The former (increase in ye) implies an outward shift of the iso-
quant, pushing k~` up (see eq. (~)). At given ye, this increase in k~ is
mitigated by the latter (increase in Py) as an increase in the expected
12) The simulations presented here are based on the coefficientsp- 0.8, O- 5, E - 0.08~, C1 - 1000, C2 - 2 and C3 - 0.5. Other coeffi-cients produced qualitatively indentical results.
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price level implies an increase of the expected rental price of capital,
but this second effect can be shown to be smaller. As the 'gap' is posi-
tive, net investment are obtained.
The capacity effect of those investments will first of all shift the ex-
pected supply curve to the right as soon as the expected macro-economic
stock of capital starts to grow (ke, see eq. (9)), which presses expected
output prices down. This reduces k~ and hence narrows the gap. The gap
also shrinks as a result of the net investments themselves (kt}1 rises if
i goes up). As soon as k~ falls below the expected stock of capital, the
gap turns negative and the above reasoning is reversed.
A long run equilibrium is established were actual and cost minimizing
stocks of capital coincide and, consequently, net investments are zero. As
both the starting position and the new equilibrium are long run stationary
equilibria, i.e., in both situations average production costs are
minimized, and since the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type,
the initial labour and capital coefficients are restored. In the new equi-
librium supply has adjusted to increased demand at the original output
price level.
This sequence of events is altered as soon as risk is introduced in the
entrepreneurial utility function.
Still, the increased demand invokes investments. But the extent to which
these investments fill the 'gap' is now higher when the gap is smaller. of
a small Igapl a larger proportion is filled. The proportion approaches
unity if the gap approaches zero, whereas in the above profit maximizing
approach this fraction was constant.
This different behaviour implies that application of (10) leads to a lar-
ger 'overshooting' by k of k", a phenomenon illustrated in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2, added in the back]
This figure displays the ratio k~kM for both alternative investment hypo-
theses. If the ratio exceeds 1, k overshoots k~; if it is lower than 1, k
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undershoots k". In the periods immediately following the impulse, k" ri-
ses, but k is still unaffected in both cases.l3) This results in initial
undershooting. After a delay, k follows k' and overshoots k" in both ca-
ses. But profit optimization (eq. (10)) leads to a larger overshooting
than profit maximization.
A higher degree of overshooting has as a consequence that the remaining
gap is now more negative. k shrinks in order to adjust to the low k". By
the same token, if investments follow (10), k undershoots k" to a relati-
vely large extent, etc.
Whereas the gap between actual and cost minimizing capítal stocks vanishes
with the symmetric investment function (in other words, as indicated
there, net investments cumulatively equal OC in Figure 1), it continuously
returns if (10) applies. As this cyclical pattern in the stock of capital
is reflected in the other economic variables and as it is not found if the
remainder of the model is combined with a profit maximizing investment
approach, we conclude that, if investments are also determined by risk,
the economy may not return to a(new) stationary equilibrium after an
impulse.
Moreover, once this business cycle is obtained, it is no longer neutral
with regard to the average (trend) values of economic variables, as a
result of the asymmetry signaled above.
Over the business cycle, a large (small) capital stock coincides on the
one hand with a large (small) supply of products, low (high) output prices
and losses (profits), and on the other hand with a negative (positive)
gap. At the same time, the utility function (10) implies that entrepre-
neurs are more eager to get a cost reduction if losses (cq. modest pro-
fits) are incurred than if profits are high.
Combining the two, a high value of k causes the (negative) gap to be fil-
led (with disinvestments) relatively fast. But if k is small, the positive
gap (calling for net investments) will be filled relatively slowly: entre-
preneurs are less anxious for a cost reduction.
As a result, a high k is reduced more quickly than a low k is raised and
the average value of the capital stock is harmed by the business cycle: a
13) Due to the decision lag and installation lag.
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negative supply shock. The trend value of the capital stock shrinks rela-
tive to the one of production. And given the shape of the production func-
tion, the opposite holds for employment.
These and other effects of this phenomenon are illustrated in Table 1,
where under different assumptions the trend values (i.e., the average
values over a'steady cycle') for some key variables are shown following a
fiscal expansion,l4)
[Insert Table 1, added in the back]
As points of reference, columns 1 and 2 give the initial values and the
trend values obtained with a profit maximizing investment function,
respectively. Comparison of these columns with the remaining ones (where
eq. (10) is applied) shows that in trend values in the latter:
- the capital stock is lower than the one that results in minimization of
production costs (k C kx); (columns 1 and 2: k- k`)
- the capital intensity of the production process is lower than its ini-
tial level, the labour intensity is higher; (columns 1 and 2: both equal
1)
- whereas initially as well as in column 2 they equal 1, output prices
rise (as a result of a relatively low stock of capital) to such an ex-
tent that the initial income distribution is restored.
Other impacts of the negative supply shock are traced by comparison of
specific columns. Comparison of columns 4 and 3 learns, that, as result of
k C y C~, with an expansionary impulse, employment grows faster than
output and with a contractionary impulse, it falls less. In both instan-
ces, firm output is lower than the one obtained if risk is not a determi-
nant of investments.l5)
If only country 1 expands (column 5), in the home country similar effects
are found. The more interesting effects are, however, found abroad, i.e.,
14) 'Gi' refers to a world-wide change in government expenditures and 'G1'
indicates that government expenditures change in country 1 only.
15) In the latter case, output falls to 99.41 if Gi --lOx (not included
in table 1).
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in countries 2, 3 and 4. As (the effects on) those countries are identi-
cal, only the ones experienced by country 2 are reported (right half co-
lumn 5).
Foreign countries experience two impulses: a positive influence (positive
demand impulse, see their exports), and a negative one caused by the cre-
ation of a business cycle which reduces their average stock of capítal and
as such reduces supply (negative supply impulse). The former increases
output, capital formation and employment, the latter reduces the capital
stock and, consequently, reduces output (to a smaller extent) and
employment (to an even more limited extent). -Moreover, the supply shock
increases their output price level.- On balance, the capital stock falls,
output falls (less) and employment and prices rise. Although the former
three of these effects are the outcome of opposite impulses and, as a
consequence their sign might change, we can nevertheless conclude,
however, that under these circumstances a fiscal expansion cannot simply
be labelled 'sustaining' anymore, even though exchange rates are fixed.
With a profit maximizing investment behaviour, a temporary increase in
demand has no long run effects, as capital formation in that situation is
symmetric. But with the asymmetric investment equation, such a policy does
influence the trend values. The wave produced by the impulses again func-
tions as a negative supply shock: the average stock of capital falls and
output and employment fall with it. See columns 6 and ~, both reporting
the trend values following a lOx increase in government expenditures in a
certain period and an opposite impulse in the subsequent period. In column
6 all countries act in this respect, in column ~ only country 1 inter-
venes. Apart from some rounding errors, regardless of which country~coun-
tries intervene(s), the average long run results in all countries are
identical as the demand effect of the impulse is cancelled out. The supply
effect -a shrinking capital stock as a result of the created business
cycle- remains, and with it, in all countries, the negative effects on
capital formation, output and employment, as well as the price increasing
effects.
We conclude, that, if an asymmetric investment function applies, for ex-
ample because of the fact that risk co-determines investment behaviour,
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and a government wants to avoid negative supply shocks, it should not
function as a'shock-maker' but as a'shock-breaker'.
IV Conclusions
We presented a four country macro-economic model with flexibel output and
flexibel prices, assuming 'weakly rational' expectations. This model was
combined with one of two alternative investment hypotheses: a traditional
profit maximizing one, where investments do not depend on risk, and a
profit optimizing one, where both profit expectations and risk determined
investment plans. Several features of the latter made it more likely than
the former. Inclusion of this profit optimizing investment approach
appeared to change drastically the macro-economic effects of fiscal
policy, for example. It implied a continuously returning business cycle
(as opposed to the establishment of a new stationary equilibrium)
following an impulse. Furthermore, business cycles appeared to have
negative (as opposed to neutral) effects on capital formation, output and
employment, as well as price increasing effects. These effects are
experienced to an equal extent in all countries, regardless of the
question if the country concerned initiated the wave or not.
Finally, we concluded, that, if an asymmetric investment function applies
and a government wants to avoid negative supply shocks, it should not
function as a'shock-maker', but as a'shock-breaker'.
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1 2 3 4
Starting position ~ Gi - 10 Y, ~ Gi - 10 i ~ Gi --10 i, ~
~ id - 0.25 ~ gap ~ id - f(U) ~ id - f(U) ~
- --------------------------------------------------------
Y1 100.000 ~ Y1 100.590 ~ Y1 100.580 ~ Y1 99.3999
CO1 60.0000 ~ CO1 60.0566 ~ CO1 60.0532 ~ CO1 59.9396
I1 20.0000 ~ I1 20.1179 ~ I1 20.1125 ~ I1 19.8766
I I IEX1 16.0000 ~ EX1 16.0151 ~ EX1 1b.0142 ~ EX1 15.9839
M1 16.0000 ~ M1 16.0151 ~ M1 16.0142 ~ M1 15.9839
~ ~ ~
PY1 1.00000 ~ PY1 1.00000 ~ PY1 1.00006 ~ PY1 1.00006
PL1 0.80000 ~ PL1 0.80000 ~ PL1 0.80000 ~ PL1 0.80000
~ ~ ~
L1 100.000 ~ L1 100.590 ~ L1 100.586 ~ L1 99.4061
K1 100.000 ~ K1 100.590 ~ K1 100.562 ~ K1 99.3821
YL1 N 80.0000 ~ YL1 N 80.4717 ~ YL1 N 80.4688 ~ YL1 N 79.5249
YR1 N 0.00000 ~ YR1 N-.00000 ~ YR1 N 0.00382 ~ YR1 N 0.00411
UN1 2.98211 I UN1 2.51322 I UN1 2.51623 I UN1 3.45501
KOPT1 100.000 ~ KOPT1 100.590 ~ KOPT1 100.577 ~ KOPT1 99.3980
Y1 E 100.000 ~ Y1 E 100.590 ~ Y1 E 100.583 ~ Y1 E 99.4023
PY1 E 1.00000 ~ PY1 E 1.00000 ~ PY1 E 1.00006 ~ PY1 E 1.00007
PK1 E 0.20000 ~ PK1 E 0.20000 ~ PK1 E 0.20001 ~ PK1 E 0.20001
5 6 7
------- ---------- -- - ----- - - - -- -- --- ---- --- -- - --- - --
G1 - 10i, ~ Gi lOX temp.~ G1 lOX temp. ~
id - f(U) ~ id - f(U) ~ id - f(U) ~
------------------ ---- -- -- - - - - -- - --
Y1 100.559 ~ Y2 99.997 ~ Y1 99.990 ~ Y1 99.990 ~ Y2 99.990 ~
CO1 60.0512 ~ C02 59.9971 ~ CO1 59.9965 ~ CO1 59.9965 ~ C02 59.9965 ~
I1 20.1086 ~ I2 19.9958 ~ I1 19.9947 ~ I1 19.9947 ~ I2 19.9948 ~
EX1 15.9993 ~ EX2 16.0040 ~ EX1 15.9991 ~ EX1 15.9991 ~ EX2 15.9991 ~
M1 16.0136 ~ M2 15.9992 ~ M1 15.9990 ~ M1 15.9991 ~ M2 15.9990 ~
S1 N -.01437 ~ S2 N 0.00479 ~ ~ S1 N 0.00000 ~ S2 N -.00000 ~
PY1 1.00006 ~ PY2 1.00006 ~ PY1 1.00006 ~ PY1 1.00006 ~ PY2 1.00006 ~
PL1 0.80000 ~ PL2 0.80000 ~ PL1 0.80000 ~ PL1 0.80000 ~ PL2 0.80000 ~
~ ~
L1 100.565 ~ L2 100.003 ~
K1 100.542 ~ K2 99.981 ~
~ ~
L1 99.996 ~ L1 99.996 ~ L2 99.996
K1 99.974 ~ K1 99.974 ~ K2 99.974
~ ~
YL1 N 80.4519 ~ YL2 N 80.0026 ~ YL1 N
YR1 N 0.00378 ~ YR2 N 0.00387 ~ YR1 N
UN1 2.53306 ~ UN2 2.97957 ~ UN1
~ ~
KOPT1 100.557 ~ KOPT2 99.994 ~ KOPT1
Y1 E 100.562 ~ Y2 E 100.000 ~ Y1 E
PY1 E 1.00006 ~ PY2 E 1.00006 ~ PY1 E
PK1 E 0.20001 ~ PK2 E 0.20001 ~ PK1 E
~ ~
79.9969 ~ YL1 N 79.9969 ~ YL2 N 79.9969
0.00388 ~ YR1 N 0.00390 ~ YR2 N 0.00383
2.98521 ~ UN1 2.98523 ~ UN2 2.98513
~ ~
99.988 ~ KOPT1 99.988 ~ KOPT2 99.988
99.993 ~ Y1 E 99.993 ~ Y2 E 99.993
1.00006 ~ PY1 E 1.00006 ~ PY2 E 1.00006
0.20001 ~ PK1 E 0.20001 ~ PK2 E 0.20001
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mbols: See main text. Moreover, 1- country 1, 2- country 2,
S- trade balance, UN - rate of unemployment, KOPT - k~.
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